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BSTRACT
 
This article focuses on public debates and public policy on the Islamic head-
scarf in the Netherlands and Germany. In the Netherlands the Islamic headscarf meets with
an accommodating policy reaction, while in Germany some eight federal states have intro-
duced legislation to ban the headscarf. This difference is explained, so I argue, by national
differences in citizenship traditions. While the Netherlands represents a multicultural model,
Germany used to be the paradigmatic example of an ethno-cultural model of citizenship. Yet,
the reaction of the German left to the headscarf, while often non-accommodating, is very
differently inspired by German history than that of the right. A commonality is that in both
countries the issue is framed as a conflict between public neutrality and religious freedom,
not gender equality. An effect of the focus in the debate on neutrality is that it obscures the
agency of Islamic women and the gender dynamics in Islamic communities.
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Introduction
 
The Islamic headscarf has been a subject of public concern and public debate in
many European countries. What makes the headscarf so controversial? Demands to
wear an Islamic headscarf in public institutions typically raise questions about
neutrality. In order to secure for all citizens an equal right to form and express their
personal beliefs, the state should not identify with any particular ideology. Neutrality
is hence a precondition for religious and cultural diversity. The wearing of head-
scarves in public institutions, and in particular religious headgear worn by public
officers, may endanger this neutrality. The question then becomes what should come
first: public neutrality or the right to religious freedom of the woman concerned? A
second series of questions concerns gender equality. The headscarf is considered by
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some as a sign of women’s subordination within Islam and hence as contravening the
principle of gender equality that public institutions are supposed to subscribe. Yet,
does this warrant a ban on headscarves? A third theme concerns the headscarf as an
(ostentatious) sign of an Islam that is manifesting itself politically. Inspired by
geopolitical and national developments, the wearing of a headscarf is for many
young Muslim women not merely a religious act, but an act of cultural defiance and
increasing politisation. The religious community may also pressure individual
female members to wear headscarves. A ban on headscarves in the classroom is thus
occasionally justified as a measure to protect young women from liberal Islamic
homes against the pressures of their more stringent fellow believers. Yet restricting
the right to wear a headscarf for the sake of the freedom of some inevitably restricts
the freedom of others. In short, the Islamic headscarf poses fundamental questions
about the values and principles on which the liberal democratic state is built.
In this paper I want to discuss public debate and public policy on demands by
Islamic women to wear the headscarf in two countries, the Netherlands and
Germany. The question I shall address is twofold. 
 
●
 
What has been the political debate and policy on demands to wear Islamic head-
scarves in public institutions in the Netherlands and Germany?
 
●
 
Can this be understood in terms of national traditions of citizenship?
As my questions already indicate, I do not want to discuss what citizenship of
Islamic women ideally should entail, but rather see what policy practices have
evolved in the two countries. This is because I think, with Joseph Carens (2000: 7),
that there is a range within which liberal states are morally free to institutionalise
liberal ideas and that an excursion into the practice of liberal democracy may help
clarify the meaning of these ideas. I choose to compare Germany and the Netherlands,
because in the sociology of immigration and citizenship Germany, until the reform
of its nationality law in 2000, was considered as the paradigmatic case of an ethno-
cultural model of citizenship, while the Netherlands is considered as representing a
multicultural model. My thesis is that they will differ in their decision-making on the
Islamic headscarf and that this difference reflects the two countries’ citizenship
models.
Of course national states do not operate in a vacuum. The principles they are
supposed to abide by in their policymaking are laid down in national legislation, but
they are also bound by international treaties. Gender equality and non-discrimina-
tion of women are protected both by European legislation (see Liebert, this issue)
and by UN human-rights conventions like CEDAW (see Skjeie, this issue). One
would also expect, with the imminent accession of Turkey to the European Union,
that national debates on citizenship and diversity will take place in the context of a
European Union reflecting on the role of Christianity in a future European identity.
This paper is about the meaning political ideas take on in practice. It tries to
combine two traditions that hitherto have largely gone their separate ways: the polit-
ical philosophy of multiculturalism and the sociology of immigration and citizenship.
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In what follows I shall first outline the two theoretical perspectives that inform the
paper and then go on to sketch the public debate and public policy concerning the
headscarf in the two countries. My conclusions are necessarily tentative, because my
gathering of data is far from systematic and this paper in no way pretends to offer a
full comparison. My aim is more modest: to see whether it makes sense to combine
the two perspectives and see whether the national traditions of citizenship that are
assumed by political sociologists are found in the public decision-making on the
Islamic headscarf in the two countries.
 
Political Philosophy: The Contextual Turn
 
Liberal political philosophy, as a normative theory, aspires to define the parame-
ters of a just political order or, more modestly, to act as a social critic or to bring
us to a better understanding of the values and ideals we claim to cherish (cf.
Kukathas 2004). Whichever of these ambitions drives the philosopher, each of
them requires that one keeps one’s distance from the actual world. One cannot
envisage a better world or be critical of this one, if one is fully immersed in it.
That is at least what philosophers believe, and therefore the focus of moral reason-
ing is on abstract ideas rather than on particularities. We also see this preference
for the abstract, apart from the particular context, in moral judgement of concrete
cases. Because it is unmistakably true that in past years political philosophy has
engaged more with concrete issues of public policy and particularly so on multi-
cultural matters (e.g. Benhabib 2002; Carens 2000; Kymlicka 2001; Parekh 2000).
It might not be overstated to call this the contextual turn in political philosophy.
Yet, even if philosophers engage with concrete cases, their preference is, as Anne
Phillips phrased it ‘to separate out the issues that need to be addressed in deter-
mining what justice requires from those to be addressed in determining which
policy mechanisms will best achieve this’ (Phillips 2005: 274). Most philosophers
are realistic enough to acknowledge that public policy is the outcome of numerous
kinds of considerations, among them pragmatic concerns about contextual features
of the case (e.g. political feasibility in terms of political power relations). Yet
these are not susceptible to philosophical analysis. We should not mix up things:
‘cases illustrate principles, exemplify dilemmas, motivate people to right actions,
and the like; but cases are otherwise irrelevant to moral judgement’ (Beauchamp
& Childress 1994: 94).
Hence, the philosopher’s ‘natural’ inclination is to abstract from context. Why
then a contextual turn? This ‘contextual turn’ is inspired among other things by
the insight that if we seek to address real, existing problems, contexts cannot be
argued away. Contextual arguments may interpenetrate with principled arguments.
Contextualists still debate what theoretical consequences this should have. It is
generally accepted, however, that liberal principles are generic and that therefore
there is a range within with they can be interpreted (this is worked out in particu-
lar by Carens 2000). From this it follows that there may exist different under-
standings of core liberal concepts among different national states. It is therefore,
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from the perspective of moral theory, interesting to look at how different liberal
states have understood the liberal tradition.
 
Political Sociology: Citizenship Models
 
Comparing European national cases is what the political sociology of immigration
and citizenship does (e.g. Joppke 1999; Koopmans 
 
et al.
 
 2005; Soysal 1994). An
important impetus to this kind of research was the study by Rogers Brubaker (1992)
on citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. The thrust of his argument is
that concomitant with these countries’ state-formation process there evolved in
France and Germany nation-specific understandings of nationhood and citizenship.
While the development of these understandings of nationhood and citizenship was a
rather contingent process, once established they showed themselves to be relatively
stable models that informed these countries’ immigration and integration policies.
Although Brubaker is criticised for overestimating the stability of his models (see
Favell 1998; Joppke 1999), and there is much debate about whether the nation state
still is the relevant context for understanding migration and ethnic relations (see
Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994), the idea of nation-bound citizenship models has proven
a very useful analytical tool in comparative work on immigration and integration
policies.
Inspired by political sociology I would like to distinguish three ideal-typical
models of citizenship, a civic-assimilationist, an ethno-cultural and a multicultural
model. These models differ in how they perceive the unity of the nation. In the
civic-assimilationist model the nation is thought as an undivided community of
citizens that share common political principles. In order to secure common citizen-
ship, citizens are asked to abstract from their particularistic identities and exist in
the public sphere as citizens only. Anyone who is willing to subscribe to the
nation’s principles can in theory become a citizen. This model is therefore open to
accept immigrants as citizens. Citizens are allowed to have particularistic identi-
ties, e.g. a religious identity, but these are considered as belonging to the private
sphere and as such not relevant for their actions as citizens. France is considered as
the proto-typical example of the civic-assimilationist model, because while it is
relatively easy to acquire citizenship, citizens are expected to assimilate in one
uniform nation that can be understood as a political community transcending the
differences of its members (see Brubaker 1992). An ethno-cultural model
conceives of the nation as a culturally homogeneous community. Because of its
cultural monism, it has difficulty both in accepting cultural aliens as citizens and in
allowing other than the dominant majority’s religion in public life. Germany
figures in the literature as the prototypical ethno-cultural model (e.g. Benhabib,
2002; Brubaker, 1992). In a multicultural model, lastly, cultural and religious
diversity is not only allowed in public life, public life is often organized along the
lines of religious or secular worldviews. The nation is united by a thin core of
common values, which goes together with the co-existence of groups that have
their distinctive group identities. A multicultural model is open to accept
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immigrants as citizens and grants religious identities much visibility in public life.
The Netherlands is generally believed to represent a multicultural model (e.g.
Benhabib, 2002, Koopmans et al. 2005).
This analytical distinction into citizenship models is often combined with a
political-opportunities structure approach. This approach focuses on the interests of
the relevant political actors, their power relations, and characteristics of the institu-
tional political structure that offers certain opportunities and constraints. Political
action and its outcome, the policy solutions that are eventually adopted, are consid-
ered as shaped by the opportunities and constraints offered by the political environ-
ment (see for instance Joppke 1999).
In political philosophy multiculturalism is being discussed in normative terms,
but the debate is rather disconnected from the actual political practices of liberal
states. In the sociology of citizenship and immigration we find systematic European
comparison of national political cultures and practices. Yet because this tradition
typically seeks to explain political conflict in terms of political opportunities and
interest-driven actors, it tends to ignore the normative dimension of the conflict.
While not often combined (but see Favell 1998 or Modood 
 
et al.
 
 2006), it seems
worthwhile to integrate these traditions.
 
The Netherlands: A Multicultural Model
 
The immigration and integration policy of the Netherlands is thought to represent a
multicultural model (see Benhabib 2002; Koopmans 
 
et al.
 
 2005). Why is this so? A
sketch of Dutch policy may explain this. Access to Dutch citizenship is relatively
easy; naturalisation is possible after five years of residence. Yet, it is not so much its
immigration policy, but primarily the Netherlands’ integration policy that gave it its
image as a multicultural society. In the Minorities Memorandum of 1983 the Dutch
government expressed as its basic policy assumption the view that most immigrants
were there to stay. The Minorities Policy, as the integration policy initially was
named, considered for a certain time period the preservation of minority cultures as
a policy objective and targeted not individual immigrants, but specific immigrant
groups (Entzinger 2003).
In 1994, however, the government published the Policy Document on the
Integration of Ethnic Minorities to replace the Minorities Memorandum. In it the
government expressed its view that the preservation of minority cultures was a
responsibility of the communities themselves, not a public responsibility. The
policy focus shifted to economic integration, from which social and cultural inte-
gration were thought to follow, and from immigrant groups to the individual
immigrant (
 
ibid
 
.). Currently, the focus continues to be on individual integration,
but now there is a stronger emphasis on cultural integration as a prerequisite for
social and economic integration; the guiding idea of the new policy is ‘shared citi-
zenship’. Measures like the introduction of citizenship education, and a compul-
sory integration course for immigrants, are thought to facilitate integration and to
ensure loyalty to the central values of Dutch society.
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Yet this shift in integration policy does not mean that the Netherlands has fully
abandoned its politics of group recognition. Accommodation of immigrants’ reli-
gious needs is not dependent on the integration policy structure; they can appeal to
the Dutch pillarised law and rules. Pillarisation refers to the segmentation of Dutch
society along confessional lines that existed until the 1960s. It meant that each
group had its own state-funded schools, media, hospitals and welfare organisations,
but also its own trade unions, housing corporations or sporting organisations. As
established religions already had the right to establish their own institutions
and received public funding, this right could not be denied to new religions (see
Rath et al. 2001).
The public accommodation of immigrant groups’ religious activities and institu-
tions is a legacy of pillarisation. Yet, the impact of pillarisation is, at least in my
understanding of Dutch political culture, far greater than that. Pillarisation is
closely connected to the emancipation movements of Dutch religious minorities,
such as the Catholics and the Dutch Reformed Church in the nineteenth century.
They wrested themselves from their subordinate position by developing their own
institutions, to begin with their own schools. In the pillars the different denomina-
tions developed into strong power blocs; this pattern of group-bound emancipation
is known in the Netherlands as 
 
emancipatie in eigen kring
 
 (emancipation in one’s
own circle).
 
1
 
 As the pillars grew in strength, pillarisation also began to function as
an institutional measure to pacify the by then equally strong power blocs of the
different denominations. The pillars’s elites worked together in ruling the country,
while the ordinary believer spent his life within the confinement of his pillar
(Lijphart 1975).
I am inclined to see in pillarisation the expression of a specific Dutch interpreta-
tion of equality and neutrality. In contrast to a strictly secular model of neutrality,
pillarisation is a model in which all collective identities have an equal right to mani-
fest themselves in public. This explains why religion can be as highly visible in
Dutch public life as it is. Moreover, the right to equal treatment of rival conceptions
of the good is interpreted as a material rather than only a formal right to equality –
hence the public funding of religious institutions. Moreover, the Dutch Minorities
Policy most likely took the shape it did because of pillarisation; this is how, in the
Dutch political imagination, emancipation of minority groups takes place.
Yet there is also a serious drawback to this. It is, for instance, still current prac-
tice, even in official documents and statistics, to refer to people of immigrant
origin as Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, etc., although many of them are Dutch
nationals and born in the Netherlands. This corresponds with the public perception
of immigrants: polls show that they are not seen as Dutch (Dagevos et al. 2004).
Hyphenated identities are very rare in the Netherlands. In effect, immigrants feel
excluded from Dutch identity (e.g. Ghorashi 2003). It is these nationalist senti-
ments that an anti-immigrant party like the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) could draw on.
Hence, while since the 1960s the Netherlands secularised and de-pillarised, what
has remained untarnished is a thick notion of Dutchness that excludes people of
immigrant origin.
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Pillarisation then seems to have left a double legacy: it created the social space for
the public recognition of collective identities, from which Islamic groups benefited,
yet also allowed for an exclusive ethno-cultural notion of national Dutch identity.
This was never a problem for the old denominations, as their Dutchness was never
at stake. This is not so for immigrant groups; they seem to be locked up in their
ethno-cultural identities and locked out from Dutch identity.
 
Headscarves in the Netherlands
 
The question now is what, if anything, of this double legacy is reflected in public
debate and policy on the Islamic headscarf. It should be noted at the outset that
the Islamic headscarf is very much accepted in public life in the Netherlands.
Department store Vroom and Dreesman and supermarket Albert Heijn have even
designed special headscarves for their personnel in the business colours and with
the business logo printed on it. In public institutions like local social services,
local passenger transportation systems or prisons it is generally accepted if person-
nel wear headscarves (Okma 2003).
There is a debate on cultural diversity and gender in the Netherlands. It is to the
credit of immigrant women’s groups, and in particular politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
that subjects like honour killing, female genital mutilation and domestic violence
in immigrant families are on the political agenda. Yet the Islamic headscarf,
although frequently discussed, is not primarily debated in terms of gender equality.
One of the few exceptions is Ciska Dresselhuys, editor-in-chief of the feminist
magazine 
 
Opzij,
 
 who publicly stated that she would not hire a journalist wearing a
headscarf, because she thought this incompatible with the feminist character of
 
Opzij
 
 (Schutte & Schottelndreier 2003). The real dividing issue, however, is public
neutrality, and the dividing line between proponents and opponents is not between
immigrants and the Dutch, nor between feminists and non-feminists. Immigrant
spokesmen take positions on both sides; while jurist Afshan Ellian, a refugee from
Iran, thinks that the headscarf in incompatible with state neutrality, Milli Görüs
leader Haci Karacaer defends Islamic women’s freedom to wear or not to wear the
headscarf (Ellian 2003; Janssen 2003). Feminist immigrant women are also repre-
sented in both camps. While Hirsi Ali (2002) opposes the headscarf, Fatima Elatik,
councellor in Amsterdam, herself wears a headscarf and defends the right of
women to wear it.
 
2
 
Conflicts about the wearing of the headscarf are usually brought before the
Commission on Equal Treatment.
 
3
 
 In nearly all cases where it has been consulted,
the Commission has ruled that prohibiting wearing of the headscarf was unjustified,
because it contravenes the Dutch anti-discrimination law. The commission consid-
ers the headscarf as an expression of a Muslim woman’s religious conviction, and
as such protected by the right to freedom of religion. The commission argues that
freedom of religion is a fundamental right; it can be restricted only if it is demon-
strated that the aim to restrict the exercise of this right is legitimate, and that a ban
meets the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity (Judgment 2003-40
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Section 5.9). ‘Legitimate’ means that that the aim (of a ban) must be weighty and
non-discriminating, while the latter two requirements mean that the same goal
cannot be reached with another measure that is less discriminating (as a restrictive
measure is always, yet not necessarily unlawfully, discriminating) and that
the measure is proportional to its aim. As these conditions are usually not met, the
commission generally rules in favour of the Islamic woman concerned. The
commission held on to this ruling in the case of the wearing of the headscarf by
public officers. In a conflict between a public primary school and a trainee who
refused to take off her headscarf in the classroom, the commission ruled in favour
of the latter. The school brought forward several arguments for its policy on head-
scarves, among them that it wanted to protect Islamic girls from liberal homes
against pressure from their more stringent fellow believers. This gender argument
was not taken into consideration, but the argument that the headscarf contravenes
the neutrality of the public school was. What does educational neutrality in the
Dutch context mean then? Due to again pillarisation the Netherlands has a system
of public and denominational schools. While denominational schools have the right
to discriminate on the basis of religion, public schools do not have that right. The
public school is open to all, irrespective of their religion or philosophy of life.
Teachers do have a responsibility to teach their pupils to respect the different moral
values that exist in Dutch society. The commission judged that the fact that the
trainee ‘believes in a religion and expresses this by wearing a headscarf does not
preclude her having an open attitude and being capable of teaching in accordance
with the character of the school as a public educational institution’ (Judgment 99-
18: 3–4, cited in Saharso 2003: 15). Therefore it was not a requirement of the job
for the trainee to remove her headscarf, and consequently the commission ruled in
favour of the trainee.
The commission’s judgments, although not legally binding, met until recently
with great social acceptance and the parties usually voluntarily accepted them. This
changed in 2001. The case in which the commission’s ruling was questioned was
that of a vice assistant court’s clerk. The court in question refused to hire the clerk
because she was not prepared to take off her headscarf during public court
sessions. Again the case was framed as a conflict between religious freedom and
the neutrality of public office. The commission judged that to exclude clerks with
headscarves from the office in order to guarantee an impartial judiciary was a
disproportionate measure and violated the anti-discrimination law (Verhaar &
Saharso 2004). This time, however, the judgment gave rise to a hot public debate.
Eventually the Law Minister intervened and declared that headscarves and other
religious symbols are not allowed for court personnel, because ‘particularly in a
multicultural society, it is of vital importance that people in court can trust judges
to take distance from their personal beliefs’ (
 
ibid
 
.: 187). The National Board for
Jurisdiction concurred with this view and agreed that religious symbols are not
allowed in the courtroom (
 
ibid
 
.: 188).
In another development in November 2002, students at an Amsterdam educa-
tional centre started to wear the 
 
niqaab
 
, a garment that covers the face, and were
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eventually sent away from school on 23 January 2003 when they refused to remove
it. This time the Commission on Equal Treatment ruled that the ban was lawful,
because there were objective grounds for its justification. The main ground was that
the 
 
niqaab
 
 hampered communication, which is essential in a pedagogical relation-
ship (Judgment 2003-40). The minister of education saw in the case cause to issue a
guideline on clothing in schools that was based on the criteria of the Commission on
Equal Treatment. The minister explained that the guideline was not meant to ban
headscarves in general, but that only the 
 
niqaab
 
 did not meet the criteria (Leidraad
kleding op scholen 2003). Next, a proposal was made in parliament to forbid the
wearing of headscarves for all public officers, yet this was rejected.
 
4
 
 Recently, the
city council of Rotterdam discussed headscarves for public officers, but again
decided that as long as they do not cover the face they are allowed.
 
5
 
 Hence, the
Islamic headscarf has clearly become more contested over the past years, but this
has as yet not resulted in a general ban on headscarves in the Netherlands.
For us it is important to note that the debate on the Islamic headscarf in the
Netherlands takes place in terms of liberal principles. It is not, however, about
gender equality, despite the fact that gender equality has a strong advocate in the
person of Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
 
6
 
 The debate is mainly about public neutrality and how
that should be balanced against other competing principles. The accommodating
institutional and legal practices concerning the Islamic headscarf that evolved in the
Netherlands are based, it seems, on a common tacit understanding among all politi-
cal actors of the functioning of the Dutch political system. In line with their tradition
of pillarisation the Dutch seek to reach neutrality not through a strict hands-off
approach, but through a policy of evenhandedness among different convictions in
public life. Public neutrality does as yet not require in the eyes of the Dutch a
general ban on headscarves. The policy line is that each individual case should be
examined as to whether there are functional reasons to forbid the wearing of the
headscarf.
 
Germany: An Ethno-cultural Model
 
In the literature on nation, migration and citizenship Germany figures as the proto-
typical example of the ethno-cultural citizenship model. This is primarily because of
the German rules concerning access to citizenship that existed until 2000. Several
authors have signalled the anomaly that the largest immigrant group in Germany,
Turkish labour migrants and their children, do not possess German citizenship,
despite long residence or even birth in Germany, while immigrants from Eastern
Europe, who were considered as co-ethnics, had (at least until 1993) direct access to
German citizenship (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999; Koopmans 1999). The
explanation for this discrepancy is the German definition of who is a member of
the national community as it was expressed in German nationality rules. Until the
reform in 2000 of the German nationality act there existed high barriers for non-
Germans to acquire German citizenship; birth on German territory gave no auto-
matic right to German nationality. The requirement that applicants had to prove
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‘
 
Bekenntnis zum deutschen Kulturkreis
 
’ (commitment to the German cultural
realm), while participation in a political emigrant organisation was considered as
proof that the applicant lacked this commitment to Germany, was also telling
(Koopmans 1999: 630). Enshrined in German naturalisation rules was the idea, as
Joppke put it, that ‘the adoption of German citizenship was always exceptional and
contingent upon a magic transformation of the applicant into a quasi-ethnic German
 
before
 
 being granted the formal membership status’ (Joppke 1999: 189, emphasis
original).
Who, then, was a German according to German law? According to Article 116 of
the German Constitution Germans need not live in Germany, nor possess German
nationality. ‘Members of the German people’, according to Article 6 of the Federal
Law on Expellees, ‘are those who have committed themselves in their homelands to
Germanness, in as far as this commitment is confirmed by certain fact such as
descent, language, upbringing or culture’ (quoted in Koopmans 1999). This ethno-
cultural notion of German citizenship is described by Brubaker (1992) as the
outcome of the German state-formation process in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries. One would expect that the experience with the Nazi regime would
have discredited this ethno-cultural notion of German citizenship, yet it continued to
exist. The explanation is, according to Brubaker, that the founders of the West
German Federal Republic did not want to validate the division of Germany. Next,
there was the massive post-war expulsion of some twelve million ethnic Germans
from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Two-thirds of them were resettled in
West Germany and conferring the legal status of ‘German’ on them was a way to
regulate the status of these refugees and expelled people. Later, ethnic Germans
from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were allowed to come, because in the
Cold War period these other ethnic Germans were considered as having escaped
communism (Brubaker 1992: 165–171).
We see this ethno-cultural citizenship model reflected in the realm of integration,
in the sense that Germany long kept to the myth that it was not an immigrant country
and did not develop an overarching integration policy. The prevailing view was,
after all, that there were no new Germans that needed to be integrated into German
society. Consequently, Germany has done little in the way of recognising immigrant
groups’ cultural claims. There was also little need for cultural recognition: organisa-
tions of Turkish immigrants were and to a large extent still are homeland oriented
and did not make claims for cultural recognition by the German state (see Joppke
1999: 208–209). As Koopmans and colleagues (2005: 174) suggest, their legal
status as foreigners caused all political actors, including the Turkish immigrants
themselves, to see them not as part of the German community. Next, there is
German history that hampers the articulation of cultural claims as there is in
Germany due to its national socialist past among the left a strong resistance to the
re-introduction of strong concepts of cultural group identities into the political (see
Benhabib 2000: 78; Joppke 1999: 209).
In effect, the relevant political actors were, albeit for different reasons, not inter-
ested in a reform of the German nationality law. While the right was inspired by
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an ethnic notion of citizenship that excluded culturally different people from
German citizenship, the multicultural left thought the idea of a national identity
obsolete and expected it soon to be replaced by a European identity. Hence the left
sought to strengthen the position of immigrants not through making German citi-
zenship accessible to them but by enlarging their rights as foreigners (Joppke
1999: 188–189).
The reform of the German Nationality Act in 2000 made it easier for immigrants
and their children to obtain German citizenship. The reform makes clear that
German citizenship for immigrants has been accepted in Germany. This has paved
the way for a structural integration policy that is based on an encompassing vision
on immigration and integration. The Süsmuth Commission was installed to develop
that vision. In its report 
 
Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern
 
 (Design Immi-
gration, Promote Integration), published in 2001, it made a case for better integra-
tion programmes, elite immigration and a structural concept for future immigration,
as it viewed this as inescapable considering demographic developments in
Germany and Europe in general (Süsmuth Commission 2001). The Süsmuth report
forms the basis of the current immigration and integration policies.
While Brubaker stated in 1992 that ‘Germany does not understand itself as a
country of immigration for non-Germans’ (Brubaker 1992: 174), which led him to
expect that Germany would not adopt a civic notion of citizenship that enabled
foreigners to become German citizens, it eventually did so. It required the fall of the
Iron Curtain and Germans, right and left, to get used to the idea that Turks could be
Germans, but it happened. This once again underlines that national traditions need
sustenance in the present in order to stay alive. Yet, this short excursion into
German ideas on nation, migration and citizenship is also proof to Brubaker’s thesis
that the political imagination of Germans was long dominated by an ethno-cultural
model of citizenship that was not dependent on a relationship with the national terri-
tory of the state. The question is whether this model has really been fully relin-
quished or whether we can see its legacy in the political struggle over the Islamic
headscarf.
 
Headscarves in Germany
 
Gender and cultural diversity seem to have attracted less public attention in Germany
than in the Netherlands, which is not surprising given the German under-politisation
of immigrant culture and identity. That is not to say that the Islamic headscarf is not
being discussed in Germany. The focal point of the German debate is the case of
Fereshta Ludin, a schoolteacher in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, who for
five years fought a legal battle over the right to wear the headscarf.
 
7
 
 Ludin is an
Islamic woman of Afghan descent who has lived in Germany since 1987 and who
became a German citizen in 1995. She did teacher training, passed her exams in
July 1998 and has since qualified to teach in ‘Grund-’ and ‘Hauptschule’; that is,
to children aged 4–14. When she applied for a job as a teacher, the Upper
School Authority in Stuttgart refused to hire her, because she was not prepared to
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take off her headscarf while teaching. Ludin brought her case before the Stuttgart
Administrative Court, which on 24 March 2000 ruled in favour of the School
Authority. Then she appealed to the Upper Administrative Court of the state of
Baden-Württemberg, which turned down her appeal on 26 June 2001. Her next
appeal to the Federal Administrative Court was also unsuccessful; the ruling was on
4 July 2002. Finally, she went to the Federal Constitutional Court, which reached its
judgment on 24 September 2003.
What were the arguments put forward in this case? As Ludin was not prepared to
take off her headscarf, the Stuttgarter Upper School Authority thought her unfit for
the job of a teacher in a public school. The headscarf is, according to the School
Authority, an expression of cultural limitation and therefore not only a religious, but
also a political, symbol. The objective effect of the headscarf is cultural de-integration,
which is incompatible with public neutrality, it opined (
 
Urteil
 
: 2).
Ludin herself expressed the view that the headscarf is part of her religious iden-
tity. A ban on headscarves would infringe on her religious freedom and hence on a
fundamental right. Ludin’s central claim, however, was that according to German
law neutrality did not mean that the state had to fully abstract from religious rela-
tions, but to make possible a sparing compromise (‘
 
schonenden Ausgleich
 
’). In her
appeal to the Federal Administrative Court it was formulated thus: ‘In contrast to a
laicist state the Federal Republic Germany is, because of its Constitution, open for
religious expression in the school realm following a so-called overarching, open and
respecting neutrality. The school is no haven where one can close one’s eyes to
social plurality and reality. Rather the school has the educational task to prepare
adolescents for what they will meet in society’ (
 
Urteil
 
: 5).
The School Authority recognised the positive religious freedom of the teacher,
yet there were also the negative religious freedom of the pupils, the educational
right of the parents and the state’s duty to neutrality to consider. These justified a
restriction of the teacher’s religious freedom. It explained that even if Ludin did not
engage in missionary activities, the wearing of the headscarf forced pupils to engage
with this expression of religious belief and as young people they are still easily
influenced. Particularly, it could create considerable pressure on Muslim schoolgirls
to adapt, contradicting the pedagogical mission of the school to promote the integra-
tion of Muslim pupils (
 
Urteil
 
: 3).
The Administrative Court of Stuttgart agreed that the wearing of the headscarf
made Ludin unfit for the job of public school teacher and followed the School
Authority’s argumentation. It also recognised the danger of (unintended) influenc-
ing (
 
ibid
 
.).
The Upper Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg followed the argumenta-
tion of the Stuttgart Administrative Court. In addition, it reasoned that the different
religious convictions of the pupils and their parents met each other in the school
very intensively. The conflict that arose from this demanded a compromise in prac-
tical concordance (‘
 
ein Ausgleich in praktischer Konkordanz
 
’). It explained that ‘the
duty to public neutrality that the constitution demands is not a distancing, rejecting
neutrality in the sense of a non-identification with religions and philosophies of life,
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but a respecting precautionary [
 
vorsorgende
 
] neutrality, that obliges the state to
guarantee both the individual and the religious communities a space to exist’ (
 
ibid
 
.:
3–4). Because of this precautionary neutrality the state should not endanger the reli-
gious peace in the school. The negative freedom of the pupils of other faiths and the
pedagogic right of parents with respect to religion should take precedence over the
teacher’s positive religious freedom.
The Federal Administrative Court also saw the conflict as basically between posi-
tive and negative religious freedom and judged again that the latter should take
precedence (
 
ibid
 
.: 4–5).
The Federal Constitutional Court, however, came up with a different judgment. It
ruled that the mere fact of a schoolteacher wearing a headscarf and the possible reli-
gious influence and religious conflict that could ensue were not enough to declare
the teacher as unfit for teaching in a public school, that is to say, under the existing
laws in Baden-Württemberg. It noticed that the legislators in the federal states are
free to adjust their law if they find it wanting. It added that the growing religious
diversity in society could be a reason to revise the law and legal limitations on the
freedom of religion were conceivable. Moreover, there might be good reasons to
give the public duty to neutrality in the educational realm a more strict and more
distancing meaning than it has had until now. How to react to the changed social
relations is, however, not for the court to decide, but is a task of the democratically
legitimised federal state legislator (
 
ibid
 
.: 14–15). The court therefore issued a
double judgment: 
1. A ban on teachers wearing the headscarf in school and while teaching does
not find enough legal ground in the standing law of the federal state of Baden-
Württemberg.
2. The change of society that is connected to growing religious plurality can be
a cause for the legislature to redefine the allowed range of religious relations in
the school. (
 
Urteil
 
: 1).
Since then eight states have passed new regulations that restrict the wearing of reli-
gious clothes and symbols in schools, five of them, the Southern states ruled by
Christian Democrat cabinets, making an exception for ‘Christian-Occidental’ clothes
and symbols. The other eight states have not (yet) passed any regulations (Berghahn
and Rostock, 2007). Remarkable is the exception for Christian and Jewish clothes
and symbols in the five Southern states. The justification for this is, as Baden-Würt-
temberg formulated it in its new law that “the representation of Christian and Occi-
dental values or traditions corresponds to the educational mandate of the constitution
and does not contradict the required behaviour (that is for teachers to refrain from
any expression of a political, religious or other worldview which could endanger the
neutrality of the state or peace in the school, SS)” (law cited in Joppke 2006). Hence,
crucifixes, crosses and nuns habit are not banned from the public school, because
they are symbols of Christianity, which is considered as part of, if not constitutive
for, German national culture. The Islamic headscarf on the other hand is interpreted
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as a political symbol. The three states that request strict neutral appearance without
exceptions for Christian-occidental symbols, Berlin, Bremen and Lower Saxony, are
all ruled by left wing cabinets (Berghahn and Rostock, 2007).
The debate in Germany is varied. Franz Josef Jung, the leader of the Hessen
Christian Democratic Parliamentary Party, explained that the headscarf symbolises
oppression and lack of freedom of women and is representative of a fundamentalis-
tic God-state (Jung 2004). Also Gerhard Schröder, in 2004 speaking as Federal
Chancellor and SPD-leader, is in favour of a ban: ‘if a young woman in society
wants to wear a headscarf, I find this tolerable. If she wanted to do this as a public
officer I would say: “No, there we expect another way to dress.”’
 
8
 
 Federal President
Johannes Rau has also joined the debate: he said in his New Year’s interview of
2004 that all religions should be treated equal. ‘If the headscarf counts as a religious
expression and missionary textile, then so does the cowl and the crucifix’, said Rau.
 
9
 
It will come as no surprise that the Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber reacted
critically, saying that Rau ‘should not question our own identity as a Christian coun-
try’ (ibid). The president of the Catholic Bishops Conference, Cardinal Karl
Lehmann, doubted whether Christian and Islamic symbols could be equated. More
surprising is that Wolfgang Thierse, the Social Democratic chairman of the federal
parliament, agreed to the critics. He pointed out that the headscarf is for many
Islamic women a symbol of oppression (
 
ibid
 
.). In this standpoint he found feminist
Alice Schwarzer on his side (Schwarzer 2003), but also Necla Kelek (2005) and
Seyran Ates (2003), both of Turkish descent, while other feminists – among them
former Foreigner Commissioner Barbara John and Rita Süsmuth – have signed a
petition ‘No lex headscarf, for religious diversity instead of forced emancipation’
(Aufruf wider eine ‘Lex-Kopftuch!’, Emma 2004:1).
German public thought on the headscarf is far from unified, as is the policy reac-
tion. As the federal states have great autonomy, we see a wide variation of legisla-
tion. As in the Netherlands the debate is very much about the meaning of the
neutrality principle, which is also the central term in the justification of policy
measures. Unlike in the Netherlands, the reigning view among the German legisla-
tors and courts of law is that a teacher in a public school should not wear a head-
scarf. The key word to understand this view is ‘precautionary neutrality’. It is
precautionary in a double sense: to guarantee the negative freedom of the pupils to
be protected against the confrontation with other people’s religion and to prevent
possible religious conflict and thus to guarantee peace. Hence, the positive freedom
of the teacher to express her religious convictions may be restricted both for the sake
of the negative freedom of others and for the sake of peace. This would be frowned
upon by classical liberal theory, because it means that peace concerns are given
priority over a more fundamental freedom right, even in the absence of actual
conflict. To borrow the words of Carens: it seems as if here Germany’s commitment
to its own ethno-cultural model has trumped its commitment to liberal democratic
principles (Carens 2000: 26). This is even more true for other policy measures. To
allow the crucifix and the habit, but not the headscarf, in the classroom, seems to
conflict with the liberal idea of equal treatment of religions. These measures like the
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references that are made in the German debate to the Christian signature of the
German nation can only be understood as reflecting an ethno-cultural national self-
understanding. The negative position of the SPD-leaders towards the headscarf is
noteworthy. I am inclined to think it is as well inspired by German history. The
German left, while rejecting an ethno-cultural notion of nationhood, is because of
Germany’s national socialist past allergic to the re-introduction of strong concepts
of group identity and therefore not drawn to a multiculturalism Dutch style, but
rather to a French style civic-assimilationism.
 
Conclusion
 
I have sketched the Dutch citizenship model as basically multicultural, which has
historical roots in the pillarised society that the Netherlands once was. The German
citizenship model I have sketched as basically ethno-cultural, that finds its roots in
historical German notions of nationality. These models were reflected initially in the
immigration and integration policy of each of the countries; in the Netherlands in its
policy of integration with preservation of cultural group identity and in Germany in
its ethno-cultural inspired policy on access to citizenship. The two countries’ immi-
gration and integration policies seem to have converged over time. While the
Netherlands shifted towards a more cultural assimilationist integration policy,
Germany moved towards a more civic-based policy on access to citizenship.
We do not find this convergence in the debate and in particular in policymaking on
the Islamic headscarf. While an accommodating policy prevails in the Netherlands,
in Germany some eight federal states have legislation to ban the headscarf. This is
remarkable, because Germany, like the Netherlands, does not follow a hands-off
approach of strict neutrality towards religion. The difference I explain out of each
country’s citizenship tradition. A multicultural model, and certainly the Dutch
pillarised variant, allows for relatively great recognition of cultural difference and
grants religious identities much visibility in public life. Religious symbols, irrespec-
tive of which religion they symbolise, therefore find easy acceptance in Dutch public
life. We see this in the Dutch public debate and public decision-making on the head-
scarf. The German laws banning headscarves reflect in fact a double historical heri-
tage. The German voices in the public debate that claim Christianity as constitutive
for German national culture and the policies of the five federal states that allow for
Christian-Occidental symbols, but not for the Islamic headscarf seem to carry on the
ethno-cultural model of the nation as a culturally homogeneous community. An
ethno-cultural model is not necessarily hostile to the expression of religious identity
in public life, as long as it is the majority’s religion. The German left is divided over
the issue. We see this back in the debate: some, and among them feminists, are pro,
others contra headscarves in the public sphere. Those contra headscarves reject an
ethno-cultural notion of the nation. This is probably in reaction to Germany’s past.
Yet for the same historic reasons they have developed an aversion of strong collec-
tive identities into political life. They therefore prefer to replace ethno-culturalism
not by Dutch multiculturalism, but by French civic-assimilationist laïcité.
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A further thing to note is that these debates and policy-making are so strictly
national in their orientation and that in both countries the headscarf is not framed
as a gender issue, but predominantly as a conflict between public neutrality and
religious freedom. Why gender concerns play only a minor role in the debates in
both countries remains to be explained. I would expect that what is relevant here is
how the citizenship of women is given meaning in both countries. The gender
dimension of the headscarf would be that it expresses a worldview in which
women belong in the private sphere. Dutch and German political culture has for a
long time been dominated by Christian parties, which have always put an emphasis
on family values and supported the idea that the natural place of a woman is at
home. Secondly, the cultural revolution of the sixties has affected feminism in the
sense that many Dutch feminists see emancipation in broader terms than just
exchanging the conventional mom-at-home role for the role of the ambitious
career-woman (e.g. Pessers 1994). If this also holds for Germany, it would make
feminists more tolerant of a choice for a more traditional lifestyle, and by implica-
tion of a choice for a headscarf. A comparison with France, where many feminists
have engaged in the headscarf debate (see Cadot et al. 2007) suggests that in this
realm too, there may exist nation specific traditions. This is of course what the
notion of gender regime is drawing attention to; citizenship is gendered and gender
regimes vary between countries (Lewis 1992). What I want to suggest is that both
the German ethno-cultural tradition and the Dutch version of multicultural citizen-
ship may grant more space to claim the right to difference and related gender
differentiated roles than the civic-assimilationist French tradition.
Another effect of the framing of the headscarf debate in terms of neutrality is
that it obscures the agency of Islamic women. We know from Britain and France
that spurred by international events and in reaction to their deprivation and inferi-
orisation Muslim communities have reverted to traditional Islamic values. The
impact on gender relations has been that young men have turned on the women of
their community and began policing their behaviour (Afshar 1994; Amara 2003).
Gender relations intersect with community dynamics and the relationship with
wider society. When women choose to wear the headscarf they may be pressur-
ized to do so, but it may also be a choice for (a modified) tradition, a defiant re-
confirmation of their religious identity, or a reaction to contradictory identity and
loyalty claims. A debate in terms of public neutrality versus religious freedom
ignores the complex reality of their lives. Nor is it obvious that a ban on head-
scarves would add to their autonomy, as it limits choice. While it might be wished
that the voice of Islamic women would be more heard in the debate, it is also
because of this missing gender perspective that the debate is still very much over
their heads.
 
Notes
 
1. All translations of Dutch and German quotes are mine.
2. ‘Moslima sluit huwelijk van homo-politicus’, 
 
Trouw
 
, 3 April 2003, p. 3.
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3. There are of course more conflicts, but if parties do not bring them to a court or the Commission
these generally remain undocumented.
4.
 
Kamervragen met antwoorden 2003–2004
 
, 19 March 2004, Lower Chamber no. 1073.
5. ‘Kledingvoorschrift voor ambtenaar achter balie’, 
 
Rotterdams Dagblad
 
, 19 February 2005.
6. After a conflict about her Dutch nationality in 2006, which caused the fall of the Dutch cabinet, she
left the country for the US where she is now working for the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, the conservative think-tank of the Bush administration.
7. All information on the Ludin case is based on the Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court
(Urteil BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 3.6.2003, herinafter Urteil) which I checked with the judgments of
the lower courts.
8. Gefährlich; Intoleranzen: Die Leitkultur untergräbt die Sittlichkeit, 
 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
 
24 November 2004, p. 33.
9. Kopftuch schlimmer als Kruzifix? Streit um religiöse Symbole in Schulen, 
 
ZDF Politik &
Zeitgeschehen
 
, http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/14/0,1872,2094926,00.html.
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